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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN HIGHLY 
POLITICAL SITUATIONS: THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA DISPUTE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  
KRISTEN E. BOON

 
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines formally commenced arbitration 
proceedings against China over the South China Sea dispute.
1
 China has 
refused to participate, but its rejection of the proceedings should not be 
interpreted as lack of interest. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Maritime 
boundary disputes are of key strategic importance to China, and China 
avidly watches the work of international tribunals, despite maintaining the 
position that its own boundary disputes should not be resolved through 
international adjudication.
2
  
I can attest to China’s interest in the international resolution of 
maritime disputes personally. Last year I participated in an hour-long 
interview on Radio China International about the ICJ’s 2012 decision on 
Nicaragua v. Colombia.
3
 This case addressed sovereignty over disputed 
islands in the San Andreas archipelago. For a law professor, it was like an 
early Christmas present to spend sixty minutes on public international 
radio discussing an ICJ decision. Moreover I have no doubt the interest in 
these decisions in China was based on their potential relevance by analogy 
to the ongoing disputes in the South China and East China seas. 
Today, I want to tackle the following question: What is the role of 
arbitration in highly charged political disputes, particularly when one party 
refuses to participate? I will comment on three issues: (i) the likely 
findings on jurisdiction in the South China Sea dispute, (ii) the elements of 
successful arbitration in highly charged situations, and (iii) why 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. Thanks to Julian Ku, Christopher Ward, Maja 
Basioli, and to Diana Popstefanova for her research assistance.  
 1. Statement and Notification of Claim, attached as Annex A. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the Philippines made the Statement of Claim publicly available for download. Other 
Documents, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. (July 10, 2013, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/component/docman/cat_view/8-other-documents?Itemid=546. 
 2. As a general matter, China has always been reticent to settle disputes through international 
mechanisms. For example, there has never been a contentious dispute involving China at the ICJ. 
Nonetheless, China has become an active participant in WTO proceedings and has concluded an 
extensive network of Bilateral Investment Treaties, suggesting that where business interests are 
involved, it is more amenable to international proceedings.  
 3.  Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012 I.C.J. 624 (Nov. 19). 
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international adjudication is appropriate in a politically sensitive case such 
as this one.  
I. JURISDICTION 
The case The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of 
China has been filed at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is 
acting as registry. Five tribunal members have been appointed.
4
 The 
Philippines selected one, and one was appointed on China’s behalf. All 
tribunal members are extremely well regarded within the profession. 
The Tribunal met in July 2013, issued a procedural order indicating 
submissions would be due in March 2014. The order also indicated that 
the admissibility and merits phases will be decided together. On March 1, 
2014 the Philippines filed its memorial, while China, as anticipated, has 
chosen not to participate. At the time of writing, the only document 
publically available in the case is the Philippines Notification and 
Statement of Claim.
5
 
The Philippines has asked the tribunal a number of questions, including 
whether:  
(i) China’s claims based on its “nine dash line” are inconsistent with 
UNLOS and therefore invalid,  
(ii) Certain of the maritime features claimed by both China and the 
Philippines are islands, low tide elevations or submerged banks, and 
whether they are capable of generating entitlements to maritime 
zones greater than 12M under Article 121 of UNCLOS, and 
(iii) China has violated the right of navigation of the Philippines, 
and therefore the rights of the Philippines in regard to the living and 
non-living resources within its exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf. 
The first task for the Tribunal is to determine whether or not it has 
jurisdiction over these claims. Specifically, are the questions put to the 
tribunal by the Philippines permissible, given China’s reservation to 
UNCLOS for disputes over maritime sovereignty?
6
  
 
 
 4. The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529 (last accessed Mar. 14, 2014). 
 5. Statement and Notification of Claim, supra note 1. 
 6. “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures 
provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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As a general matter, UNCLOS requires that parties submit their 
disputes to dispute resolution.
7
 The system establishes a comprehensive 
dispute resolution mechanism, with various options, arbitration being the 
default method.
8
 However, there is an important exception with regards to 
subject matter: states are not required to submit questions of maritime 
sovereignty if they enter the appropriate reservation.
9
 This exception was 
created because states decided these types of disputes can be sensitive, and 
because there is no consensus between states regarding the substantive 
rules to be applied to sea boundary delimitations.
10
 China has entered such 
a reservation, and the first thing the Tribunal will have to determine is 
whether the Philippines request is within its scope. 
The Philippines has tried to frame the questions in its Notification and 
Statement of Claim to suggest that the arguments involve an interpretation 
of the convention rather than a determination of maritime sovereignty, 
which would be prohibited. But it is clear that some of the questions back 
onto questions of maritime sovereignty. In particular, the invitation to the 
Tribunal to rule on the 9-dash line and the request that the Tribunal rule on 
the Philippines rights beyond the EEZ clearly raise sovereignty issues.
11
  
My impression is that the Philippines recognizes that some of the 
questions presented to the Tribunal may not be cognizable. Although 
officially, the Philippines is seeking clarification of its rights, in an off the 
record conversation with a government official, I was told that they see no 
harm in asking for the moon, because an answer to any of the questions 
will be helpful as the Philippines defines its rights. Even a narrow ruling 
could have benefits: it would offer a legal evaluation by a highly respected 
tribunal, and it may give some clarity to other states in the region. 
The question that is least likely to run afoul of China’s reservation, and 
thus most likely to proceed to arbitration is the second question on 
 
 
referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.” ITLOS, DECLARATIONS OF 
STATES PARTIES RELATING TO SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 298 
(OPTIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF PART XV, SECTION 2, OF THE CONVENTION) 
(2011), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/298_declarations_ 
June_2011_english.pdf. 
 7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1933 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  
 8. Under UNCLOS annex VII, art. III, the tribunals are composed of five arbitrators and are 
free to determine their own procedure. 
 9. UNCLOS art. 298.  
 10. Anne Sheehan, Dispute Settlement Under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation 
Disputes, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 165, 166 (2005). 
 11. For an overview of the 9-dash line, see Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Ja, The Nine-Dash Line in 
the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98 (2013). 
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whether the maritime features are islands, pursuant to Article 121 of 
UNCLOS.
12
 Because this question involves an interpretation of UNCLOS, 
which would fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and does not need to 
address Maritime sovereignty, I believe there is a reasonable chance the 
Tribunal will determine it has jurisdiction over this aspect of the claim.
13
  
II. WHEN DOES ARBITRATION WORK IN POLITICALLY CHARGED 
SITUATIONS? 
In my view, there are three conditions for successful arbitration on 
highly political issues such as cultural issues and boundary disputes:  
(i) Consent of the parties, 
(ii) The ability of politicians to sell the process of arbitration to their 
people, 
(iii) Arbitral tribunal’s ability to tactically manage consent.14 
Consent is important because the states involved need to make a 
commitment to submit themselves to a third party. Parties often get to 
arbitration after negotiations fail, and the leaders want a resolution. 
However, states must be willing to acknowledge that the arbitral tribunal 
can change legal entitlements.  
The Philippines has arrived at a place where arbitration is viewed as 
one of the only viable options on the table. China, however, clearly has not 
reached this point. Moreover, if this case proceeds, it will be the first time 
 
 
 12. UNCLOS art. 121.  
 Regime of islands: 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water 
at high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
Id. 
 13. Christopher Ward, Address at Australian National University, South China Sea: An 
Introduction to the Disputes and Prospects for International Law (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/events/christopher_ward_speech_august_2013.pdf. 
 14. I would like to acknowledge the excellent work of Bart L. Smit Duijzenhunst and Sophia 
L.R. Dawkins on this topic. I drew on their categorization of consent in land disputes to develop my 
approach. See Bart L. Smit Duijzenhunst & Sophia L.R. Dawkins, Arbitrary Peace? Consent 
Management in International Arbitration (Mar. 2014) (draft on file with author).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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that at ITLOS chamber proceeds with one party in absentia. However, in 
other fields, it is not so unusual. In the investor/state context, for example, 
Moldova refused to participate in proceedings pursuant to a dispute under 
a Russian–Moldovan Bilateral Investment Treaty but later went on to 
enforce an award.
15
  
Second, the politicians need to support the arbitration. Success depends 
on how states relay the arbitration process to the peoples of the country in 
question. When governments are on board, arbitration can become a way 
out of a politically sensitive situation. When they are not, however, 
arbitration can be a means to undermine other processes and potentially 
even peace agreements. It is too early to say how the Philippines will 
translate any decision by the Tribunal, but even if a ruling on the islands 
issue were to come back, for example, in China’s favor, the Philippines 
would have a political out. 
Finally, arbitrators need to manage the consent of the parties. One of 
the advantages of arbitration is that there is flexibility in the system, and 
parties have more control than they would before national courts. 
However, parties can walk away during the process, and even when parties 
agree to participate, they might reject an award. A recent example is 
Colombia’s reaction to the ICJ’s Nicaragua v. Colombia Judgement of 
2012.
16
 Indeed, Colombia withdrew from the Bogota Pact which granted 
the ICJ jurisdiction soon after the judgment was handed down.
17
 
Moreover, Nicaragua has now lodged a new case at the ICJ to try to 
finalize the maritime boundary, before the ICJ’s jurisdiction ends. These 
events illustrate how even after parties consent, and a tribunal determines 
it has jurisdiction, and that tribunal renders an award that tries to reach an 
equitable solution for both parties, one side may reject it. Enforcement, 
therefore, can raise a secondary set of issues altogether.  
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Jarrod Hepburn, Moldova Loses Another Treaty Arbitration with Russian Investor, 
But Shows Signs of Cooperation with the Arbitration System, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER 
(May 11, 2012) http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110517_3. 
 16. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012 I.C.J. 624 (Nov. 19). 
 17. See American Treaty On Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 17, 30 U.N.T.S. 
449 (imposing a general obligation on the signatories to settle their disputes through peaceful means, 
and conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-
42.html#Colombia.  
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III. WHAT CAN ARBITRATION DO FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE?  
Although Philippines is ready, willing and able to proceed, there is 
little debate that China has no interest in participating. Without the consent 
and participation of one of the parties, the arbitration process itself is 
unlikely to resolve the problem. That does not mean, however, that there is 
no value in the process. The Philippines has keenly demonstrated that it is 
complying with the spirit of UNCLOS by submitting the case for 
adjudication. Moreover, there are clear side benefits to the overall resort to 
international dispute resolution: 
 the process might unlock the diplomatic impasse between China 
and the Philippines,  
 it may clarify the legal status of some of the maritime features, 
and 
 it may bring the issue into the international legal realm. 
The analogy of East Timor/Australia is relevant here. The countries were 
in negotiations for years over ownership of resources off the continental 
shelf when Timor, finally, threatened to take Australia to the ICJ. 
Australia responded by withdrawing from the Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, soon thereafter, they entered into a settlement. The moral of the 
story is that starting a case can be a good negotiating strategy.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many countries are attempting to get “bigger” by defining their 
maritime entitlements like the extent of their continental shelf. It should 
not be surprising that this is creating friction where claims overlap, or 
where one country starts to bump up against the sovereignty of another. 
There are approximately 180 unresolved maritime disputes around the 
globe, and dispute resolution is becoming increasingly appealing when 
bilateral negotiations fail or stall. All indicators suggest that the need for 
dispute resolution in maritime matters will increase. These are precisely 
the kinds of cases where we need international law. 
The PCA, the ICJ, and ITLOS are charged with a growing number of 
cases that have been resolved in a highly competent manner in a highly 
consistent way. We need an international court with international 
jurisprudence particularly in the type of situation where regional tensions 
run high. From this perspective, China’s reticence is unfortunate.  
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ANNEX A 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES  
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
MANILA 
 
 
No. 
13-0211 
 
 
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines presents its 
compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and, with respect to the 
dispute with China over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the West 
Philippine Sea, the Government of the Philippines has the honor to submit the attached 
Notification under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Statement of Claim on which the 
Notification is based, in order to initiate arbitral proceedings to clearly establish the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines over its maritime entitlements in the 
West Philippine Sea. 
 
 
The Government of the Philippines has initiated these arbitral proceedings in 
furtherance of the friendly relations with China, mindful of its obligation under Article 
279 of UNCLOS to seek a peaceful and durable resolution of the dispute in the West 
Philippine Sea by the means indicated in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
 
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines avails itself 
of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the 
assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
 
Manila, 22 January 2013 
 
The Embassy of the People's Republic of China  
 
Manila 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Attachments: Notification and Statement of Claims 
NOTIFICATION 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. The Republic of the Philippines brings this arbitration against the People's Republic 
of China to challenge China's claims to areas of the South China Sea and the underlying 
seabed as far as 870 nautical miles from the nearest Chinese coast, to which China has no 
entitlement under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS", 
or "the Convention"), and which, under the Convention, constitute the Philippines' exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf. 
 
2. Despite China's adherence to UNCLOS in June 1996, and the requirement of Article 
300 that States Parties fulfill in good faith their obligations under the Convention, China has 
asserted a claim to "sovereignty" and "sovereign rights" over a vast maritime area lying 
within a so-called "nine dash line” that encompasses virtually the entire South China Sea. 
By claiming all of the waters and seabed within the "nine dash line", China has extended its 
self-proclaimed maritime jurisdiction to within 50 nautical miles ("M") off the coasts of the 
Philippine islands of Luzon and Palawan, and has interfered with the exercise by the 
Philippines of its rights under the Convention, including within its own exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf, in violation of UNCLOS. 
 
3. Further, within the maritime area encompassed by the "nine dash line", China has laid 
claim to, occupied and built structures on certain submerged banks, reefs and low tide 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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elevations that do not qualify as islands under the Convention, but are parts of the 
Philippines' continental shelf, or the international seabed; and China has interfered with the 
exercise by the Philippines of its rights in regard to these features, and in the waters 
surrounding them encompassed by China's designated security zones. 
 
4. In addition, China has occupied certain small, uninhabitable coral projections that are 
barely above water at high tide, and which are "rocks" under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. 
China has claimed maritime zones surrounding these features greater than 12M, from which 
it has sought to exclude the Philippines, notwithstanding the encroachment of these zones 
on the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, or on international waters. 
 
5. In June 2012, China finally created a new administrative unit, under the authority of 
the Province of Hainan, that included all of the maritime features and waters within the 
"nine dash line". In November 2012, the provincial government of Hainan Province 
promulgated a law calling for the inspection, expulsion or detention of vessels "illegally" 
entering the waters claimed by China within this area. The new law went into effect on 1 
January 2013. 
 
6. In response to these and other unlawful acts in contravention of UNCLOS, the 
Philippines seeks an Award that: (1) declares that the Parties' respective rights and 
obligations in regard to the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea 
are governed by UNCLOS, and that China's claims based on its "nine dash line" are 
inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid; (2) determines whether, under 
Article 121 of UNCLOS, certain of the maritime features claimed by both China and the 
Philippines are islands, low tide elevations or submerged banks, and whether they are 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
496 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:487 
 
 
 
 
 
capable of generating entitlement to maritime zones greater than 12 M; and (3) enables the 
Philippines to exercise and enjoy the rights within and beyond its exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf that are established in the Convention. 
 
7. The Philippines does not seek in this arbitration a determination of which Party enjoys 
sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation of 
any maritime boundaries. The Philippines is conscious of China's Declaration of 25 August 
2006 under Article 298 of UNCLOS, and has avoided raising subjects or making claims that 
China has, by virtue of that Declaration, excluded from arbitral jurisdiction. 
 
8. All of the Philippines' claims in this arbitration have been the subject of good faith 
negotiations between the Parties. There have been numerous exchanges of views. The 
requirements of Article 279 have been satisfied. There is, therefore, no bar to the Arbitral 
Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the Philippines. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Maritime Areas 
 
9. The South China Sea, part of which is known in the Philippines as the West 
Philippine Sea, is a semi-enclosed sea in Southeast Asia that covers approximately 2.74 
million square kilometers. The Sea is surrounded by six States and Taiwan. To the north 
are the southern coast of mainland China, and China's Hainan Island. To the northeast lies 
Taiwan. To the east and southeast is the Philippines. The southern limits of the sea are 
bounded by Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. And to the west is Vietnam. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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10. There are many small insular features in the South China Sea. They are largely 
concentrated in three geographically distinct groups: the Paracel Islands in the northwest; 
Scarborough Shoal in the east; and the Spratly Islands in the southeast. The Paracel Islands 
are not relevant to this arbitration. Scarborough Shoal, located approximately 120M west of 
the Philippines' coast and more than 350M from China, is a submerged coral reef with six 
small protrusions of rock above sea level at high tide. The Spratly Islands are a group of 
approximately 150 small features, many of which are submerged reefs, banks and low tide 
elevations.· They lie between 50 and 350 M from the Philippine island of Palawan, and 
more than 550M from the Chinese island of Hainan. None of the Spratly features occupied 
by China is capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own. 
 
11. Notwithstanding its adherence to UNCLOS, China claims almost the entirety of the 
South China Sea, and all of the maritime features, as its own. Specifically, China claims 
"sovereignty'' or "sovereign rights" over some 1.94 million square kilometers, or 70% of 
the Sea's waters and underlying seabed within its so-called "nine dash line." China first 
officially depicted the "nine dash line" in a letter of 7 May 2009 to the United Nations 
Secretary General. It is reproduced below. According to China, it is sovereign over all of 
the waters, all of the seabed, and all of the maritime features within this "nine dash line". 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I 
 
12. In the east, the "nine dash line" depicted in China's letter is less than 50M off the 
Philippine island of Luzon. In the southeast it is within 30M from Palawan. In both 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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respects, it cuts through - and cuts off - the Philippines' 200 M exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf, in violation of UNCLOS. Within the area encompassed by the "nine 
dash line", China has engaged in conduct that has unlawfully interfered with the 
Philippines' right of navigation, notwithstanding that some of the area is in the Philippines' 
own exclusive economic zone, and the rest is high seas; and China has interfered with the 
exercise by the Philippines of its rights to the living and non-living resources in 'its 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending west from the island of Luzon, 
and northwest from the island of Palawan. China has also violated the Philippines' rights by 
exploiting the living resources in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. 
 
13. China's interference with and violations of the Philippines' rights under UNCLOS 
have been steadily escalating. In June 2012, China placed the entire maritime area within 
the "nine dash line" under the authority of the Province of Hainan, which, in November 
2012, in the exercise of its administrative authority, promulgated a law that requires foreign 
vessels to obtain China's permission before entering the waters within the "nine dash line", 
and provides for inspection, expulsion and detention of vessels that do not obtain such 
permission. The law went into effect on 1 January 2013. 
 
B. Submerged Features 
14. Even before its first official espousal of the "nine dash line", China began to seize 
physical control of a number of submerged features and protruding rocks in the Spratly 
Islands, in the southeastern part of the Sea, and to construct artificial "islands" on top of 
them. Among the submerged features that China occupied and altered in this manner are: 
Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef. None of these features is an 
island under Article 121 of UNCLOS. They are all at best low tide elevations, far-removed 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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from China's territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Because they 
are not above water at high tide, they are part of another State's continental shelf, or the 
international seabed. Yet, China has not only acted unlawfully by seizing control of these 
submerged features; it has declared maritime zones around them, from which it has 
illegally sought to exclude the Philippines. and other States. 
 
15. Mischief Reef (Chinese name = Meiji Jiao; .known in the Philippines as Panganiban 
Reef) is a submerged bank that is part of the Philippines' continental shelf, approximately 
130 M from Palawan (and more than 600 M southeast of China's Hainan Island, the nearest 
Chinese land territory). Mischief Reef lies at approximately 9° 54'N-115° 32'E. Since 1995, 
China has constructed buildings and other facilities on stilts and concrete platforms at four 
different sites atop Mischief Reef, despite repeated protests from the Philippines. 
 
16. McKennan Reef (Chinese name = Ximen Jiao; known in the Philippines as Chigua 
Reef) is a low tide elevation located at approximately 9° 53'5"N-114° 28'E. It is 
approximately 180 M west of the Philippine island of Palawan, and is also part of the 
Philippines' continental shelf. China has constructed buildings and other facilities on stilts 
and concrete platforms at this feature, as well, despite the Philippines' protests. 
 
17. China has not only unlawfully seized parts of the Philippines' continental shelf, but 
has also wrongfully sought to prevent Philippine vessels from approaching Mischief Reef 
and McKennan Reef, even though the surrounding waters are within the Philippines' 
exclusive economic zone. 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/10
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18.  Gaven Reef (Chinese name = Nanxun Jiao) is a low tide elevation located at 
approximately 10° 13' N-114° 13'E. It lies approximately 205M northwest of Palawan. 
 
19.  Subi Reef (Chinese name= Zhubi Jiao; known in the Philippines as Zamora Reef) is a 
low tide elevation located at approximately 10° 55'N-ll4° 05'E. It lies approximately 230M 
west of Palawan. 
 
C.  Insular Features 
20.  In 2012, China seized six small rocks that protrude above sea level within the 
Philippines' exclusive economic zone, unlawfully claimed an exaggerated maritime zone 
around these features, and wrongfully prevented the Philippines from navigating, or 
enjoying access to the living resources within this zone, even though it forms part of the 
Philippines' EEZ. These half dozen protrusions, which ·are known collectively as 
Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc in the Philippines; Huang Yan Dao in China), are 
located approximately 120 M west of the Philippine island of Luzon. They are rocks both 
literally and under Article 121 of UNCLOS. None is more than 3 meters ("m") above sea 
level at high tide; and none measures more than a few meters in width. None of the rocks, 
which lie in close proximity to one another, generates entitlement to more than a 12 M 
territorial sea. Yet, China, which like the Philippines asserts sovereignty over Scarborough 
Shoal, claims a much larger maritime zone for itself, to the limit of the "nine dash line" 
approximately 70M to the east. 
 
21. Until April 2012, Philippine fishing vessels routinely fished in this area, which is 
within the Philippines' 200 M exclusive economic zone. Since then, China has prevented 
the Philippines from fishing at Scarborough Shoal or in its vicinity, and undertaken other 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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activities inconsistent with the Convention. Only Chinese vessels are now allowed to fish 
in these waters, and have harvested, inter alia, endangered species such as sea turtles, 
sharks and giant clams which are protected by both international and Philippine law. 
 
22. To the southwest of Scarborough Shoal, in the Spratly Islands, China has seized 
similar features. China presently occupies the following features which, though above 
water at high tide, are uninhabitable and incapable of supporting economic life in their 
natural state. They are therefore "rocks" within the meaning of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS: 
 
• Johnson Reef (Chinese name = Chigua Jiao; known in the Philippines as 
Mabini Reef), located at approximately 9° 42' N-114°22' E and 
approximately 180M northwest of Palawan. 
 
• Cuarteron Reef (Chinese name=Huayang Jiao; known in the Philippines as 
Calderon Reef), located at approximately 8° 51'N-112° 50'E and 
approximately 245M west of Palawan; and 
 
• Fiery Cross Reef (Chinese name = Yongshu Jiao; known in the Philippines 
as Kagitingan Reef), located at approximately 9° 33'N-112° 54'E and 
approximately 255M west of Palawan; 
 
23. All of these features are submerged reefs with no more than a few rocks protruding 
above sea level at high tide. Johnson Reef has a few rocky protrusions rising above water at 
high tide. Cuarteron Reef is a collection of coral rocks reaching no higher than 1.5 m. Fiery 
Cross Reef consists of a submerged bank with protruding rocks no more than 1 m above 
sea level at high tide. 
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24. Notwithstanding that all of these insular features are "rocks" under Article 121(3) of 
UNCLOS, China unlawfully claims entitlements to maritime zones greater than 12M in the 
waters and seabed surrounding them, and wrongfully excludes the Philippines and other 
States from these areas. Moreover, in the case of Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, the 
maritime zones claimed by China unlawfully encroach upon the Philippines' 200 M 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending from Luzon and Palawan, and 
prevent the Philippines from enjoying its rights under the Convention within 200 M. 
 
D. Exchanges of Views 
25. On numerous occasions, dating back at least to 1995, the Philippines and China have 
exchanged views regarding the settlement of their disputes concerning entitlements to 
maritime areas in the South China Sea, the exercise within those maritime areas of rights 
pertaining to navigation and the exploitation of living and non-living resources, and the 
status of maritime features in the Spratly Islands and at Scarborough Shoal. 
 
26. The Parties have been exchanging views on these disputes in attempts to achieve 
negotiated solutions since the first "Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South 
China Sea Issue" were held in August 1995. However, despite many bilateral meetings and 
exchanges of diplomatic correspondence over more than 17 years since those first 
consultations were held, no settlements have been reached on any of these disputed 
matters. 
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27. In regard to entitlements to maritime areas in the South China Sea, the Philippines 
has consistently expressed the view to China in bilateral meetings and diplomatic 
correspondence that it is entitled to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of 
200 M from its archipelagic baselines, and to the exclusive enjoyment of the living and 
non-living resources in these zones, as well as to the right to navigate without interference 
by China within and beyond its 200 M limit. In response, China has repeatedly expressed 
the conflicting view that it is entitled to all the maritime space encompassed by its "nine 
dash line", to all the living and non-living resources within this limit, and to control 
navigation within this area. By its diplomatic note dated 21 November 2012, the 
Philippines declared, as it did on numerous prior occasions, that it cannot accept the 
validity of the "nine dash line" or China's claims based thereon. Over the past 17 years of 
such exchanges of views, all possibilities of a negotiated settlement have been explored and 
exhausted. 
 
28. With respect to the status of maritime feature in the Spratly Islands and adjacent 
waters, and rights to navigate and exploit the living resources in these waters, the Parties 
have exchanged views since at least august 1995, and as recently as July 2012. The 
Philippines has repeatedly protested Chinese activities on and adjacent to Subi Reef and 
Mischief Reef, which form part of the Philippines' continental shelf, as well as China's 
claims and activities in regard to the other maritime features in the Spratly group occupied 
or claimed by China. China has consistently rejected the Philippines' protests and 
maintained its occupation of and activities on these features. Each Party has protested 
interference by the other with its claimed navigational rights, and with its claimed rights to 
the living resources, in the waters adjacent to these features. None of the protests, or 
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ensuing meetings or diplomatic correspondence in which views were exchanged, resulted 
in the settlement of these disputes. 
 
29. With respect to the status of the maritime features at Scarborough Shoal and adjacent 
waters, and rights to navigate and exploit the living resources in these waters, the Parties 
have been exchanging views regarding the settlement of their dispute since at least May 
1997. Most recently, during a series of meetings in Manila in April 2012, the Parties once 
again exchanged views on these matters without arriving at a negotiated solution. As a 
result of the failure of negotiations, the Philippines later that month sent China a diplomatic 
note in which it invited China to agree to bring the dispute before an appropriate 
adjudicatory body. China declined the invitation. 
 
30. The diplomatic record leaves no doubt that the requirement in Article 283 that the 
"parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its 
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means" has been satisfied. 
 
III. THE PHILIPPINES' CLAIMS 
 
31. Based on the foregoing and the evidence to be submitted in the course of this 
arbitration, the Philippines asserts the following claims: 
 
• China's rights in regard to maritime areas in the South China Sea, like the 
rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by UNCLOS, and 
consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II of 
the Convention, to an Exclusive Economic Zone under Part V, and to a 
Continental Shelf under Part VI; 
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•  Accordingly, China's maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its 
so-called "nine dash line" are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid; 
 
• Submerged features in the South China Sea that are not above sea level at 
high tide, and are not located in a coastal State's territorial sea, are part of the 
seabed and cannot be acquired by a State, or subjected to its sovereignty, 
unless they form part of that State's Continental Shelf under Part VI of the 
Convention; 
 
• Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef are submerged 
features that are not above sea level at high tide, are not islands under the 
Convention, are not located on China's Continental Shelf; and China has 
unlawfully occupied and engaged in unlawful construction activities on 
these features; 
 
• Mischief Reef and McKennan Reef are part of the Philippines' Continental 
Shelf under Part VI of the Convention. 
 
• Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef are 
submerged features that are below sea level at high tide, except that each has 
small protrusions that remain above water at high tide, which qualify as 
"rocks" under Article 121(3) of the Convention, and generate an entitlement 
only to a Territorial Sea no broader than 12 M; and China has unlawfully 
claimed maritime entitlements beyond 12 M from these features; 
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• China has unlawfully prevented Philippine vessels from exploiting the living 
resources in-the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef; 
 
• The Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 M Territorial Sea, a 200 
M Exclusive Economic Zone, and a Continental Shelf under Parts II, V and 
VI of UNCLOS, measured from its archipelagic baselines; 
 
• China has unlawfully claimed rights to, and has unlawfully exploited, the 
living and non-living resources in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone 
and Continental Shelf, and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines from 
exploiting the living and non-living resources within its Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf; and 
 
• China has unlawfully interfered with the exercise by the Philippines of its 
rights to navigation under the Convention. 
 
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
 
32. The Philippines and China are both parties to UNCLOS, having ratified the 
Convention on 8 May 1984 and 7 June 1996, respectively. It follows that both Parties have 
given their advance consent to the regime of settlement of disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention established in Part XV. 
 
33. Article 279 of the Convention requires States Parties to seek a solution by peaceful 
means in accordance with the UN Charter. Article 283(1) further requires that when a 
dispute arises between States Parties, they should proceed expeditiously to an exchange of 
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views regarding a settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. The Philippines has 
complied with the requirements of Article 279 and Article 283(1) fully and in good faith, 
and has exhausted possibilities of settlement by negotiation. 
 
34. As the Philippines and China have failed to settle the dispute between them by 
peaceful means of their own choice, Article 281(1) allows recourse to the procedures 
provided for in Part XV, including compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions 
under Section 2 of Part XV. Article 286 allows these compulsory procedures to be initiated 
by any State Party in the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 2. 
 
35. The choice of compulsory procedures is governed by Article 287, the first paragraph 
of which allows a State Party, by means of a written declaration, to choose one or more of 
the means for settlement of disputes listed therein, including recourse to an arbitral tribunal 
under Annex VII of the Convention. States Parties to a dispute which have not made 
declarations pursuant to Article 287(1) are deemed by operation of Article 287(3) to have 
accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. 
 
36. Since neither the Philippines nor China has made a declaration pursuant to Article 
287(1), and since no agreement to the contrary currently exists, it follows that, in 
accordance with Article 287(5), this dispute may be submitted to arbitration under Annex 
VII of the Convention. 
 
37. The jurisdiction of an Annex VII tribunal extends to any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, subject to the provisions of Section 3 of 
Part XV. 
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38. Section 3 of Part XV contains optional exceptions from jurisdiction in Article 298. 
Such exceptions have been invoked by China in a formal declaration dated 25 August 
2006. 
39. None of these exceptions is applicable to the Philippines' claims in this arbitration. 
The present dispute concerns (a) whether, in light of China's repeated assertions of alleged 
"sovereign rights and jurisdiction" within the so-called "nine dash line", the Parties' 
respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters, seabed and maritime features of 
the South China Sea are governed by the provisions of UNCLOS, including but not limited 
to Articles 3-14 of Part II, Articles 55 and 57 of Part V, Article 76 of Part VI, Article 121 
of Part VIII Article 300 of Part XVI; (b) whether China’s Claims based on the "nine dash 
line" are inconsistent with those provisions; (c) whether, under Article 121 of UNCLOS, 
certain of the maritime features in the South China Sea are islands, low tide elevations or 
submerged banks, and whether they are capable of generating entitlements to maritime 
zones greater than 12M; and (d) whether China has violated the right of navigation of the 
Philippines in the waters of the South China Sea, and the rights of the Philippines in regard 
to the living and non-living resources within its exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf. 
 
 
40. It follows that the Philippines' claims do not fall within China's Declaration of 25 
August 2006, because they do not: concern the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 
74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations; involve historic bays or titles within the 
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Convention; concern military activities or law 
enforcement activities; or concern matters over which the Security Council is exercising 
functions assigned to it by the UN Charter. 
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V.  RELIEF SOUGHT 
41. In light of the above, and the evidence to be submitted in the course of this 
arbitration, the Philippines respectfully requests that the Arbitral Tribunal issue an Award 
that: 
 
• Declares that China's rights in regard to maritime areas in the South China 
Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by 
UNCLOS, and consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
under Part II of the Convention, to an Exclusive Economic Zone under Part 
V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI; 
 
• Declares that China's maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its 
so-called "nine dash line" are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid; 
 
• Requires China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its 
obligations under UNCLOS; 
 
• Declares that Mischief Reef and McKennan Reef are submerged features 
that form part of the Continental Shelf of the Philippines under Part VI of the 
Convention, and that China's occupation of and construction activities on 
them violate the sovereign rights of the Philippines; 
 
• Requires that China end its occupation of and activities on Mischief Reef 
and McKennan Reef; 
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• Declares that Gaven Reef and Subi Reef are submerged features in the South 
China Sea that are not above sea level at high tide, are not islands under the 
Convention, and are not located on China's Continental Shelf, and that 
China's occupation of and construction activities on these features are 
unlawful; 
 
• Requires China to terminate its occupation of and activities on Gaven Reef 
and Subi Reef; 
 
• Declares that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery 
Cross Reef are submerged features that are below sea level at high tide, 
except that each has small protrusions that remain above water at high tide, 
which are "rocks" under Article 121(3) of the Convention and which 
therefore generate entitlements only to a Territorial Sea no broader than 12 
M; and that China has unlawfully claimed maritime entitlements beyond 12 
M from these features; 
 
• Requires that China refrain from preventing Philippine vessels from 
exploiting in a sustainable manner the living resources in the waters adjacent 
to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, and from undertaking other 
activities inconsistent with the Convention at or in the vicinity of these 
features; 
 
• Declares that the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 M Territorial 
Sea, a 200 M Exclusive Economic Zone, and a Continental Shelf under Parts 
II, V and VI of UNCLOS, measured from its archipelagic baselines; 
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• Declares that China has unlawfully claimed, and has unlawfully exploited, 
the living and non-living resources in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf, and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines 
from exploiting living and non-living resources within its Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf; 
 
• Declares that China has unlawfully interfered with the exercise by the 
Philippines of its rights to navigation and other rights under the Convention 
111 areas within and beyond 200 M of the Philippines' archipelagic 
baselines; and 
 
• Requires that China desist from these unlawful activities. 
 
 
VI. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR 
 
42. In accordance with the requirements of UNCLOS Annex VII, Article 3(b), the 
Philippines hereby appoints Judge Rudiger Wolfrum as a member of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
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VII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS 
 
43. The Philippines reserves the right to supplement and/or amend its claims and the 
relief sought as necessary, and to make such other requests of the Arbitral. Tribunal as may 
be required, to preserve its rights under UNCLOS, including a request for provisional 
measures.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
Francis H. Jardeleza 
Solicitor General 
Republic of the Philippines 
Agent 
22 January2013 
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